Hunting off the Red Banner

Hunting Accelerated Adversaries:
Detecting Malware-Free Breakouts and Identity Abuse


The modern cyber threat landscape is defined by extreme speed; the fastest recorded breakout time from initial compromise to lateral movement is now as low as 51 seconds. This acceleration is fueled by the widespread adoption of malware-free Living-off-the-Land (LoL) techniques and the industrialization of cybercrime via Initial Access Brokers (IABs).


Think of the cyber defense as a pit crew using hand tools while the adversary is now driving a highly optimized, automated race car. Every second spent on manual investigation or remediation translates directly into higher risk exposure, maximizing the potential impact of a breach.


This speed dramatically accelerates business risk: financial losses are realized faster, operational downtime is minimized for the attacker but maximized for the victim, and recovery costs surge as persistence is established before detection. Furthermore, the focus on identity-based techniques like DCSync and DCShadow targets the core of organizational compliance and trust models, leading to severe regulatory and reputational damage.


Some organizations could face a critical failure of perimeter security, resulting in widespread identity theft, full domain compromise, and ransomware deployment that bypasses traditional endpoint defenses reliant on file-based signatures if this accelerated approach is not addressed.


Hunting Controls & Observations

Defensive teams should pivot from file-based detection to continuous monitoring across key telemetry sources, given that 79% of observed threats were malware-free:


  • Endpoint (EDR/AV): Monitor for execution of built-in scripting processes (e.g., PowerShell, WMI, `cmd.exe`) when launched by unusual parent processes or containing encoded arguments.
  • Identity/IAM: Hunt for new logons from impossible travel scenarios, multiple failed logon attempts indicative of credential stuffing, or privileged access requests from non-standard domain controllers.
  • Email Security & Proxy Logs: Focus on highly sophisticated vishing (voice phishing) and AI-generated social engineering content that targets high-value employees for initial access.
  • Firewall / NetFlow: Watch for rapid, high-volume, automated scanning of non-traditional ports such as 5060 (VoIP/SIP) and 502 (OT/Modbus) from both external and unexpected internal sources.
  • Cloud Audit Logs: Look for attempts to enumerate roles/APIs, excessive cloud resource creation (e.g., snapshots, temporary VMs), or identity logins from high-risk geopolitical regions.
  • Windows Security Log: Closely monitor Event ID 4662 (Directory Service Access) on domain controllers for unauthorized attempts to replicate directory changes (DCSync), which often bypasses traditional logging.

Behavioral indicators of the attack included the following observations:

  • Encoded or compressed PowerShell scripts executed from temporary directories or launched directly by WMI processes (T1059.001).
  • Rapid, consecutive connection attempts from a single source IP to a wide range of internal devices on low-level ports like 502 or 5060, indicative of automated scanning.
  • The use of legitimate administrative tools and protocols (RDP, PsExec, SMB) for high-speed lateral movement across the network.
  • A non-Domain Controller computer or non-service account attempting a Directory Service Replication request (DCSync) to steal credentials.
  • Attempts to register a rogue Domain Controller to the Active Directory forest (DCShadow), creating stealthy, persistent administrator access.

MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

The core of the accelerated methodology relies on leveraging post-exploitation techniques that blend seamlessly with normal administrative activity, making behavioral detection crucial:


  • Initial Access (T1078 – Valid Accounts): Adversaries rely heavily on compromised credentials obtained through vishing, infostealers, and IABs to bypass initial perimeter controls.
  • Execution (T1059 – Command/Scripting Interpreter): The primary vector for execution, specifically utilizing PowerShell, Command Prompt, and WMI for malware-free, obfuscated code execution (LoL).
  • Credential Access (T1003.006 – OS Credential Dumping: DCSync): Exploiting Active Directory's replication process to harvest all password hashes at scale from a compromised domain controller.
  • Discovery (T1595.002 – Active Scanning): Utilizing automated tools to scan the attack surface for exposed services, particularly in IoT/OT environments, to quickly map the environment.
  • Persistence (T1207 – Rogue Domain Controller): Techniques like DCShadow are employed to maintain control over the domain by posing as an authorized Domain Controller.

Controls & Hunting Indicators

To outpace the accelerated adversary, security teams must ensure deep visibility into process execution, identity behavior, and network flow across the entire infrastructure.


Endpoint Controls

  • High-fidelity EDR/XDR telemetry must capture all command-line arguments for processes, especially for `powershell.exe`, `wmic.exe`, `psexec.exe`, and `cmd.exe`.
  • Enable and centralize PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) and Transcription to capture the de-obfuscated intent of execution, which is crucial for LoL detection.
  • Utilize Sysmon (Event ID 1 for Process Creation) to monitor for processes spawned by `WmiPrvSE.exe` or `svchost.exe` that are outside of standard operational baselines.

Network Controls

  • Implement IDS/IPS rules to flag excessive network traffic volumes or connections targeting sensitive, low-level ports like 502/5060, and ensure all RDP traffic is logged.
  • Monitor NetFlow for sudden changes in internal east-west traffic patterns, particularly spikes in SMB/RDP traffic between hosts that are not part of standard application workflows.
  • Ensure SSL/TLS inspection is configured where possible to identify encrypted C2 communication, or flag DNS queries for known malicious domains if inspection is infeasible.

Identity & Access Controls

  • Centralize Windows Event IDs 4662 (Access to an object, looking for Directory Service replication) and 4672 (Admin Logon) for all Domain Controllers to detect AD abuse.
  • Monitor Identity Provider (IdP) logs for impossible travel alerts or sudden changes in access rights immediately following a successful login, signaling account compromise.
  • Audit Privileged Access Management (PAM) logs for non-justified or non-approved access requests to highly sensitive domain administrator accounts.

Cloud & SaaS

  • Continuously audit cloud provider logs (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log) for configuration changes, such as modifying storage policies or escalating IAM role privileges.
  • Implement geographical restrictions or alerts for login attempts to SaaS and Cloud control planes from high-risk countries or those not typically used by the organization.

Application & Service Logs

  • Aggregate DNS query logs to identify initial communication to newly registered or suspicious C2 domains associated with infostealers or IAB-purchased infrastructure.
  • Analyze web proxy logs for sequential, rapid attempts to access multiple internal or external network resources, indicating automated discovery.

Known Indicators of Compromise

The following IOCs have been identified and can be used for threat hunting. Note that in malware-free attacks, behavioral indicators are often more reliable than static IOCs:

  • File Hashes:
    None available / provided
  • IP Addresses:
    None available/Provided (General: Focus on rapid connections from external IPs)
  • Domains:
    Redline (Infostealer) C2 domains, Vidar (Infostealer) C2 domains. (e.g., aioffensiveplatform[.]net or other conceptual AI tool hosting)
  • File Paths:
    %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\[random].lnk (Persistence)
    C:\Users\Public\Downloads\[RATName].exe (Suspicious download locations)
  • Registry Keys:
    Run/RunOnce keys referencing PowerShell/WMI scripts

Threat Hunting Queries

The following queries translate the behavioral indicators into actionable detection logic for immediate deployment across popular SIEM/EDR platforms. These are designed to detect stealthy, malware-free behaviors.


Query 1: Detect Highly Obfuscated PowerShell Execution (LoL)

  • Behavior Targeted: Stealthy, malware-free execution using encoded commands via Windows built-in tools (PowerShell/WMI).
  • MITRE ATT&CK: T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1027 (Obfuscated Files)
  • Expected Results: Encoded strings in command lines, often launched by `powershell.exe` or `wmic.exe`.
  • False Positive Likelihood: Medium – Encoding is used by legitimate automation tools. Tune by excluding known benign scripts/tools.

Splunk (SPL)


// Query: Detect Encoded Command Execution
// Purpose: Identify PowerShell or WMIC processes launching encoded or highly obfuscated commands.
// Tuning Guidance: Exclude known automation scripts or deployment tools that legitimately use the EncodedCommand flag.
index=windows 
(ProcessName IN ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wmic.exe")) 
(CommandLine="*EncodedCommand*" OR CommandLine="*FromBase64String*")
| table _time, host, user, process, command_line
| sort - _time

Microsoft Defender/Sentinel (KQL)


// Query: Detect Highly Obfuscated PowerShell Execution
// Purpose: Identify attempts to execute highly encoded or compressed PowerShell commands.
// Data Tables: DeviceProcessEvents
// Tuning Guidance: Exclude known benign automation scripts used in your environment (e.g., deployment tools).
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "EncodedCommand"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Query 2: Detect Active Directory DCSync Activity (Identity Abuse)

  • Behavior Targeted: Unauthorized replication of Active Directory data, typically resulting in password hash theft.
  • MITRE ATT&CK: T1003.006 (OS Credential Dumping: DCSync)
  • Expected Results: Non-Domain Controller computers or non-service accounts attempting Directory Service Replication.
  • False Positive Likelihood: Low – Replication is a DC-only or highly privileged operation. Tune by excluding verified backup/monitoring services.

Splunk (SPL)


// Query: Detect DCSync/AD Replication Access (Event ID 4662)
// Purpose: Identify high-privilege users attempting to replicate directory changes, an indicator of DCSync.
// Tuning Guidance: Exclude known legitimate DC and backup user accounts (e.g., in a lookup table). Focus on the Access_Mask="0x100".
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Directory-Service EventCode=4662 
(Object_Type="CN=Directory-Service-Replication" AND Access_Mask="0x100") 
| table _time, host, user, Object_Type, Access_Mask, Object_Name
| sort - _time

Microsoft Defender/Sentinel (KQL)


// Query: Detect DCSync Activity
// Purpose: Identify devices attempting to replicate password hash data from a Domain Controller.
// Data Tables: IdentityDirectoryEvents
// Tuning Guidance: Exclude built-in system accounts known to perform replication (Domain Controllers Group members).
IdentityDirectoryEvents
| where ActionType == "DCSync"
| project TimeGenerated, TargetDeviceName, TargetAccountName, TargetAccountUpn, Application, Protocol
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Query 3: Detect High-Volume Automated Scanning of VoIP/OT Ports

  • Behavior Targeted: Unusually high volume of network connections/failures targeting vulnerable protocols like SIP (VoIP) or Modbus (OT).
  • MITRE ATT&CK: T1595.002 (Active Scanning), T1046 (Network Service Discovery)
  • Expected Results: A single external IP making an unusual number of failed connection attempts to ports 5060 or 502 across multiple internal devices.
  • False Positive Likelihood: Medium/High – Requires tuning to exclude known vulnerability scanners, asset management tools, and legitimate VoIP providers.

Splunk (SPL)


// Query: Detect Excessive Connections to VoIP/OT Ports
// Purpose: Identify source IPs making an excessive number of connections on exposed SIP (5060) or Modbus (502) ports.
// Tuning Guidance: Use a short time window (e.g., earliest=-1h). Increase the count threshold for high-volume environments.
index=network (dest_port=5060 OR dest_port=502)
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port
| where count > 100 
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, count
| sort - count

Microsoft Defender/Sentinel (KQL)


// Query: High-Volume Failed Network Connections (Recon)
// Purpose: Identify external IPs rapidly scanning the environment for known vulnerable protocols (SIP, Modbus, RDP).
// Data Tables: NetworkConnectionEvents
// Tuning Guidance: Adjust the 'threshold' (e.g., 50 failed connections per hour is a starting point). Exclude known benign scanning IPs.
NetworkConnectionEvents
| where RemotePort in (502, 5060, 3389) and IsSuccess == false
| summarize Count=count() by RemoteIP, RemotePort, DeviceName
| where Count > 50 
| order by Count desc

Source and Credits

This intelligence analysis synthesizes information from CrowdStrike's article "2025 Global Threat Report" and Fortinet's report "2025 Global Threat Landscape Report"